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Abstract
Learning is a task that generalizes many of the analyses that are applied to collections of
data, in particular, to collections of sensitive individual information. Hence, it is natural to
ask what can be learned while preserving individual privacy. [Kasiviswanathan, Lee, Nissim,
Raskhodnikova, and Smith; FOCS 2008] initiated such a discussion. They formalized the notion
of private learning, as a combination of PAC learning and dierential privacy, and investigated
what concept classes can be learned privately. Somewhat surprisingly, they showed that for
nite, discrete domains (ignoring time complexity), every PAC learning task could be performed
privately with polynomially many labeled examples; in many natural cases this could even be
done in polynomial time.
While these results seem to equate non-private and private learning, there is still a signicant
gap: the sample complexity of (non-private) PAC learning is crisply characterized in terms of
the VC-dimension of the concept class, whereas this relationship is lost in the constructions of
private learners, which exhibit, generally, a higher sample complexity.
Looking into this gap, we examine several private learning tasks and give tight bounds on
their sample complexity. In particular, we show strong separations between sample complexities
of proper and improper private learners (such separation does not exist for non-private learners),
and between sample complexities of ecient and inecient proper private learners. Our results
show that VC-dimension is not the right measure for characterizing the sample complexity of
proper private learning.
We also examine the task of private data release (as initiated by [Blum, Ligett, and Roth;
STOC 2008]), and give new lower bounds on the sample complexity. Our results show that the
logarithmic dependence on size of the instance space is essential for private data release.
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Consider a scenario in which a survey is conducted among a sample of random individuals and data
mining techniques are applied to learn information on the entire population. If such information
will disclose information on the individuals participating in the survey, then they will be reluctant
to participate in the survey. To address this question, Kasiviswanathan et al. [19] introduced
the notion of private learning, where a private learner is required to output a hypothesis that
gives accurate classication while protecting the privacy of the individual samples from which the
hypothesis was obtained.
The denition of a private learner is a combination of two qualitatively dierent notions. One
is that of probably approximately correct (PAC) learning [26], the other of dierential privacy [13].
PAC learning, on one hand, is an average case requirement, which requires that the output of
the learner on most samples is good. Dierential privacy, on the other hand, is a worst-case
requirement. It is a strong notion of privacy that provides meaningful guarantees in the presents of
powerful attackers and is increasingly accepted as a standard for providing rigorous privacy. Recent
research on privacy has shown, somewhat surprisingly, that it is possible to design dierentially
private variants of many analyses. Further discussions on dierential privacy can be found in the
surveys of Dwork [11, 12].
We next give more details on PAC learning and dierential privacy. In PAC learning, a collec-
tion of samples (labeled examples) is generalized into a hypothesis. It is assumed that the examples
are generated by sampling from some (unknown) distribution D and are labeled according to an
(unknown) concept c taken from some concept class C. The learned hypothesis h should predict
with high accuracy the labeling of examples taken from the distribution D, an average-case re-
quirement. In dierential privacy the output of a learner should not be signicantly aected if a
particular example is replaced with an arbitrary example. Concretely, dierential privacy considers
the collection of samples as a database, denes that two databases are neighbors if they dier in
exactly one sample, and requires that for every two neighboring databases the output distribution
of a private learner should be similar.
In this paper, we consider private learning of nite, discrete domains. Finite domains are
natural as computers only store information with nite precision. The work of [19] demonstrated
that private learning in such domains is feasible { any concept class that is PAC learnable can be
learned privately (but not necessarily eciently), by a \private Occam's razor" algorithm, with
sample complexity that is logarithmic in the size of the hypothesis class.1 Furthermore, taking
into account the earlier result of [3] (that all concept classes that can be eciently learned in the
statistical queries model can be learned privately and eciently) and the ecient private parity
learner of [19], we get that most \natural" computational learning tasks can be performed privately
and eciently (i.e., with polynomial resources). This is important as learning problems generalize
many of the computations performed by analysts over collections of sensitive data.
The results of [3, 19] show that private learning is feasible in an extremely broad sense, and
hence, one can essentially equate learning and private learning. However, the costs of the private
learners constructed in [3, 19] are generally higher than those of non-private ones by factors that
depend not only on the privacy, accuracy, and condence parameters of the private learner. In
particular, the well-known relationship between the sample complexity of PAC learners and the VC-
dimension of the concept class (ignoring computational eciency) [6] does not hold for the above
1Chaudhuri and Hsu [8] prove that this is not true for continuous domains.
1Concept Class Sample Complexity
POINTd
Non-Private Learning Improper Private Proper Private
(Proper or Improper) Learning Learning
(1) [6, 15] (1) (d)
\ POINTd
Non-Private Learning Inecient Proper Ecient Proper
(Ecient or Inecient) Private Learning Private Learning2
(1) [6, 15] (`(d)) (d)
Table 1: Our separation results (ignoring dependence on ;;), where `(d) is any function that
grows as !(logd).
constructions of private learners; the sample complexity of the algorithms of [3, 19] is proportional
to the logarithm of the size of the concept class. Recall that the VC-dimension of a concept class is
bounded by the logarithm of its size, and is signicantly lower for many interesting concept classes,
hence, there may exist learning tasks for which \very practical" non-private learner exists, but any
private learner is \impractical" (with respect to the sample size required).
The focus of this work is on a ne-grain examination of the dierences in complexity between
private and non-private learning. The hope is that such an examination will eventually lead to an
understanding of which complexity measure is relevant for the sample complexity of private learning,
similar to the well-understood relationship between the VC-dimension and sample complexity of
PAC learning. Such an examination is interesting also for other tasks, and a second task we examine
is that of releasing a sanitization of a data set that simultaneously protects privacy of individual
contributors and oers utility to the data analyst. See the discussion in Section 1.1.2.
1.1 Our Contributions
We now give a brief account of our results. Throughout this rather informal discussion we will
treat the accuracy, condence, and privacy parameters as constants (a detailed analysis revealing
the dependency on these parameters is presented in the technical sections). We use the term
\ecient" for polynomial time computations.
Following standard computational learning terminology, we will call learners for a concept class
C that only output hypotheses in C proper, and other learners improper. The original motivation
in computational learning theory for this distinction is that there exist concept classes C for which
proper learning is computationally intractable [25], whereas it is tractable to learn C improperly [26].
As we will see below, the distinction between proper and improper learning is useful also when
discussing private learning, and for reasons other than making intractable learning tasks tractable.
Our results on private learning are summarized in Table 1.
1.1.1 Proper and Improper Private Learning
It is instructive to look into the construction of the private Occam's razor algorithm of [19] and
see why its sample complexity is proportional to the logarithm of the size of the hypothesis class
used. The algorithm uses the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [23] to choose a
hypothesis. The choice is probabilistic, where the probability mass that is assigned to each of the
2These bounds are for a slightly relaxed notion of proper learners as detailed in Section 6.
2hypotheses decreases exponentially with the number of samples that are inconsistent with it. A
union-bound argument is used in the claim that the construction actually yields a learner, and a
sample size that is logarithmic in the size of the hypothesis class is needed for the argument to go
through. The question is whether such sample size is required?
To address the above question, we consider a simple, but natural, class POINT = fPOINTdg
containing the concepts cj : f0;1gd ! f0;1g where cj(x) = 1 for x = j, and 0 otherwise. The VC-
dimension of POINTd is one, and hence, it can be learned (non-privately and eciently, properly or
improperly) with merely O(1) samples.
In sharp contrast, (when used for properly learning POINTd) the above-mentioned private Oc-
cam's razor algorithm from [19] requires O(log(jPOINTd j)) = O(d) samples { obtaining the largest
possible gap in sample complexity when compared to non-private learners! Our rst result is a
matching lower bound. We prove that any proper private learner for POINTd must use 
(d) sam-
ples, therefore, answering negatively the question (from [19]) of whether proper private learners
should exhibit sample complexity that is approximately the VC-dimension (or even a function of
the VC-dimension) of the concept class. 3
A natural way to improve the sample complexity is to use the private Occam's razor to improp-
erly learn POINTd with a smaller hypothesis class that is still expressive enough for POINTd, reducing
the sample complexity to the logarithm of the smaller hypothesis class. We show that this indeed
is possible, as there exists a hypothesis class of size O(d) that can be used for learning POINTd
improperly, yielding an algorithm with sample complexity O(logd). Furthermore, this bound is
tight, any hypothesis class for learning POINTd must contain 
(d) hypotheses. These bounds are
interesting as they give a separation between proper and improper private learning { proper pri-
vate learning of POINTd requires 
(d) samples, whereas POINTd can be improperly privately learned
using O(logd) samples. Note that such a combinatorial separation does not exist for non-private
learning, as VC-dimension number of samples are needed and sucient for both proper and im-
proper non-private learners. Furthermore, the 
(d) lower bound on the size of the hypothesis class
maps a clear boundary to what can be achieved in terms of sample complexity using the private
Occam's razor for POINTd. It might even suggest that any private learner for POINTd should use

(logd) samples.
It turns out, however, that the intuition expressed in the last sentence is at fault. We construct
an ecient improper private learner for POINTd that uses merely O(1) samples, hence, establishing
the strongest possible separation between proper and improper private learners. For the construc-
tion, we extrapolate on a technique from the ecient private parity learner of [19]. The construction
of [19] utilizes a natural non-private proper learner, and hence, results in a proper private learner.
Due to the bounds mentioned above, we cannot use a proper learner for POINTd, and hence, we
construct an improper (rather unnatural) learner to base our construction upon. Our construction
utilizes a double-exponential hypothesis class, and hence, is inecient (even outputting a hypoth-
esis requires super-polynomial time). We use a simple compression using pseudorandom functions
(akin to [24]) to make the algorithm ecient.
The above two improper learning algorithms use \heavy" hypotheses, that is, the hypotheses
are Boolean functions that return 1 on many inputs (in contrast to a point function that returns 1
on exactly one input). Informally, each such heavy hypothesis protects the privacy since it could
have been returned on many dierent concepts. The main technical point in these algorithms is
3Our proof technique yields lower bounds not only on private learning POINTd properly, but on private learning of
any concept class C with various hypothesis classes that we call -minimal for C.
3how to choose a heavy hypothesis with a small error. To complete the picture, we prove that
using heavy hypotheses is unavoidable: Every private learning algorithm for POINTd that uses o(d)
samples must use heavy hypotheses.
Next we look into the concept class INTERVAL = fINTERVALdg, where for T = 2d we dene
INTERVALd = fc1;:::;cT+1g and, for 1  j  T + 1, the concept cj : f1;:::;T + 1g ! f0;1g is
dened as follows: cj(x) = 1 for x < j and cj(x) = 0 otherwise. As with POINTd, it is easy to
show that the sample complexity of any proper private learner for INTERVALd is 
(d). We give
two results regarding the sample complexity of improper private learning of INTERVALd. The rst
result shows that if a sublinear (in d) sample complexity private learner exists for INTERVALd, then
it must output, with high probability, a very \complex looking" hypothesis in the sense that the
hypothesis must switch from zero to one (and vice-versa) exponentially many times, unlike any
concept cj 2 INTERVALd that switches only once from one to zero at j. The second result considers
a generalization of the technique that yielded the O(1) sample improper private learner for POINTd,
and shows that it alone would not yield a private learner for INTERVALd with sublinear (in d) sample
complexity.
We apply the above lower bound on the number of samples for proper private learning POINTd
to show a separation in the sample complexity of ecient proper private learners (under a slightly
relaxed denition of proper learning) and inecient proper private learners. More concretely,
assuming the existence of a pseudorandom generator with exponential stretch, we present a concept
class \ POINTd { a subset of POINTd { such that every ecient private learner that learns \ POINTd using
POINTd requires 
(d) samples. In contrast, an inecient proper private learner exists that uses only
a super-logarithmic number of samples. This is the rst example in private learning where requiring
eciency on top of privacy comes at a price of larger sample size.
1.1.2 The Sample Size of Non-Interactive Sanitization Mechanisms
Given a database containing a collection of individual information, a sanitization is a release of
information that protects the privacy of the individual contributors while oering utility to the
analyst using the database. The setting is non-interactive if once the sanitization is released, then
the original database and the curator play no further role. Blum et al. [4] presented a construction
of such non-interactive sanitizers for count queries. Let C be a concept class consisting of eciently
computable predicates from a discretized domain X to f0;1g. Given a collection D of data items
taken from X, Blum et al. employ the exponential mechanism [23] to (ineciently) obtain another
collection D0 with data items from X such that D0 maintains approximately correct count of P
d2D c(d) for all concepts c 2 C provided that the size of D is O(log(jXj)  VCDIM(C)). As
D0 is generated using the exponential mechanism, the dierential privacy of D is protected. The
database D0 is referred to as a synthetic database as it contains data items drawn from the same
universe (i.e., from X) as the original database D.
We provide a new lower bound for non-interactive sanitization mechanisms. We show that for
POINTd every non-interactive sanitization mechanism that is useful4 for POINTd requires a database
of size 
(d). This lower bound is tight as the sanitization mechanism of Blum et al. for POINTd
uses a database of size O(dVCDIM(POINTd)) = O(d). Our lower bound holds even if the sanitized
output is an arbitrary data structure, i.e., not necessarily a synthetic database.
4Informally, a mechanism is useful for a concept class if for every input, the output of the mechanism maintains
approximately correct counts for all concepts in the concept class.
41.2 Related Work
The notion of PAC learning was introduced by Valiant [26]. The notion of dierential privacy was
introduced by Dwork et al. [13]. Private learning was introduced in Kasiviswanathan et al. [19].
Beyond proving that (ignoring computation) every concept class with nite, discrete domain can
be PAC learned privately (see Theorem 3.2 below), Kasiviswanathan et al. proved an equivalence
between learning in the statistical queries model and private learning in the local communication
model (a.k.a. randomized response). The general private data release mechanism we mentioned
above was introduced in [4] along with a specic construction for halfspace queries. Also as men-
tioned above, both [19] and [4] use the exponential mechanism of [23], a generic construction of
dierential private analyses, which (in general) does not yield ecient algorithms.
A recent work of Dwork et al. [14] considered the complexity of non-interactive sanitization
under two settings: (a) sanitized output is a synthetic database, and (b) sanitized output is some
arbitrary data structure. For the task of sanitizing with a synthetic database they show a separation
between ecient and inecient sanitization mechanisms based on whether the size of the instance
space and the size of the concept class is polynomial in a (security) parameter or not. For the task of
sanitizing with an arbitrary data structure they show a tight connection between the complexity of
sanitization and traitor tracing schemes used in cryptography. They leave the problem of separating
ecient private and inecient private learning open.
Following the preliminary version of our paper [1], Chaudhuri and Hsu [8] study the sample
complexity for private learning innite concept classes when the data is drawn from a continuous
distribution. Using techniques very similar to ours, they show that, under these settings, there
exists a simple concept class for which any proper learner that uses a nite number of examples
and guarantees dierential privacy, fails to satisfy accuracy guarantee for at least one unlabeled
data distribution. This implies that the results of Kasiviswanathan et al. [19] do not extend to
innite hypothesis classes on continuous data distributions.
Chaudhuri and Hsu [8] also study learning algorithms that are only required to protect the
privacy of the labels (and not necessary protect the privacy of the examples themselves). They
prove upper bounds and lower bounds for this scenario. In particular, they prove a lower bound on
the sample complexity using the doubling dimension of the disagreement metric of the hypothesis
class with respect to the unlabeled data distribution. This result does not imply our results.
For example, the class POINTd can be properly learned using O(1) samples while protecting the
privacy of the labels, while we prove that 
(d) samples are required to properly learn this class
while protecting the privacy of the examples and the labels. It seems that label privacy may give
enough protection in the restricted setting where the content of the underlying examples is publicly
known. However, in many settings this information is highly sensitive. For example, in a database
containing medical records we wish to protect the identity of the people in the sample (i.e., we do
not want to disclose that they have been to a hospital).
It is well known that for all concept classes C, every learner for C requires 
(VCDIM(C))
samples [15]. This lower bound on the sample size also holds for private learning. Blum, Ligett,
and Roth [5] show that this result extends to the setting of private data release. They show that
for all concept classes C, every non-interactive sanitization mechanism that is useful for C requires

(VCDIM(C)) samples (remember that the best upper bound is O(log(jXj)  VCDIM(C))). We
show in Section 7 that the lower bound of 
(VCDIM(C)) is not tight { there exists a concept class
C of constant VC-dimension such that every non-interactive sanitization mechanism that is useful
for C requires a much larger sample size.
5Tools for private learning (not in the PAC setting) were studied in a few papers; such tools
include, for example, private logistic regression [9] and private empirical risk minimization [7, 22].
1.3 Questions for Future Exploration
The motivation of this work was to study the connection between non-private and private learning.
We believe that the ideas developed in this work are a rst step in developing a general theory of
private learning. In particular, we believe that there is a combinatorial measure that characterizes
private learning (for non-private learning such combinatorial measure exists { the VC dimension).
Such characterization was given recently in [2].
In this paper, the ideas used for lower bounding sample size for proper private learning of points
is also used to establish a lower bound on the sample size for sanitization of databases. Other
connections between private learning and sanitization were explored in [4]. The open question is
there is a deeper connection between the models, i.e., does any bound for one task imply a similar
bound for the other?
1.4 Organization
In Section 2, we dene private learning. In Section 3, we prove lower bounds on proper private
learning, and in Section 4, we describe ecient improper private learning algorithms for the POINT
concept class. In Section 5, we discuss private learning of the INTERVAL concept class. In Section 6,
we show a separation between ecient and inecient proper private learning. Finally, in Section 7,
we prove a lower bound for non-interactive sanitization.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We use [n] to denote the set f1;2;:::;ng. The notation O(g(n)) is a shorthand for
O(h()  g(n)) for some non-negative function h. Similarly, the notation 
(g(n)). We use negl()
to denote functions from R+ to [0;1] that decrease faster than any inverse polynomial.
2.1 Preliminaries from Privacy
A database is a vector D = (d1;:::;dm) over a domain X, where each entry di 2 D represents
information contributed by one individual. Databases D and D0 are called neighbors if they dier
in exactly one entry (i.e., the Hamming distance between D and D0 is 1). An algorithm is private
if neighboring databases induce nearby distributions on its outcomes. Formally:
Denition 2.1 (Dierential Privacy [13]). A randomized algorithm A is -dierentially private if
for all neighboring databases D;D0, and for all sets S of outputs,
Pr[A(D) 2 S]  exp()  Pr[A(D0) 2 S]: (1)
The probability is taken over the random coins of A.
An immediate consequence of (1) is that for any two databases D;D0 (not necessarily neighbors)
of size m, and for all sets S of outputs, Pr[A(D) 2 S]  exp( m)  Pr[A(D0) 2 S].
62.2 Preliminaries from Learning Theory
We consider Boolean classication problems. A concept c : X ! f0;1g is a function that labels
examples taken from the domain X by either 0 or 1. The domain X is understood to be an ensemble
X = fXdgd2N (typically, Xd = f0;1gd) and a concept class C is an ensemble C = fCdgd2N where
Cd is a class of concepts mapping Xd to f0;1g. In this paper Xd is always a nite, discrete set.
A concept class comes implicitly with a way to represent concepts and size(c) is the size of the
(smallest) representation of the concept c under the given representation scheme.
PAC learning algorithms are given examples sampled according to an unknown probability
distribution D over Xd, and labeled according to an unknown target concept cd 2 Cd. Dene the
error of a hypothesis h : Xd ! f0;1g as
error
D
(c;h) = Pr
xD
[h(x) 6= c(x)]:
Denition 2.2 (PAC Learning [26]). An algorithm A is an (;)-PAC learner of a concept class
Cd over Xd using hypothesis class Hd and sample size n if for all concepts c 2 Cd, all distributions
D on Xd, given an input D = (d1;:::;dn), where di = (xi;c(xi)) with xi drawn i.i.d. from D for
all i 2 [n], algorithm A outputs a hypothesis h 2 Hd satisfying
Pr[error
D
(c;h)  ]  1   :
The probability is taken over the randomness of the learner A and the sample points chosen accord-
ing to D.
An algorithm A, whose inputs are d;;, and a set of samples (labeled examples) D, is a
PAC learner of a concept class C = fCdgd2N over X = fXdgd2N using hypothesis class H =
fHdgd2N if there exists a polynomial p(;;;) such that for all d 2 N and 0 < ; < 1, the
algorithm A(d;;;) is an (;)-PAC learner of the concept class Cd over Xd using hypothe-
sis class Hd and sample size n = p(d;size(c);1=;log(1=)). 5 If A runs in time polynomial in
d;size(c);1=;log(1=), we say that it is an ecient PAC learner. Also the learner is called a
proper PAC learner if H = C, otherwise it is called an improper PAC learner.
A concept class C = fCdgd2N over X = fXdgd2N is PAC learnable using hypothesis class
H = fHdgd2N if there exists a PAC learner A learning C over X using hypothesis class H. If A is
an ecient PAC learner, we say that C is eciently PAC learnable.
It is well known that improper learning is more powerful than proper learning. For example,
Pitt and Valiant [25] show that unless RP=NP, k-term DNF are not eciently learnable by k-
term DNF, whereas it is possible to learn a k-term DNF eciently using k-CNF [26]. For more
background on learning theory, see [21].
Denition 2.3 (VC-Dimension [27]). Let C = fCdg be a class of concepts over X = fXdg. We
say that Cd shatters a point set Y  Xd if jfc(Y ) : c 2 Cdgj = 2jY j, i.e., the concepts in Cd
when restricted to Y produce all the 2jY j possible assignments on Y . The VC-dimension of Cd
(VCDIM(Cd)) is dened as the size of a maximum point set that is shattered by Cd, as a function
of d.
Theorem 2.4 ([6]). Let Cd be a concept class over Xd. There exists an (;)-PAC learner that
learns Cd using Cd using O((VCDIM(Cd)  log( 1
) + log( 1
))=) samples.
5The denition of PAC learning usually only requires that the sample complexity is polynomial in 1= (rather
than log(1=)). However, these two requirements are equivalent (see, e.g., [21, Section 4.2]).
72.3 Private Learning
Denition 2.5 (Private PAC Learning [19]). Let d;; be as in Denition 2.2 and  > 0. A
concept class C is privately PAC learnable using H if there exists a learning algorithm A that takes
inputs ;d;;;D, returns a hypothesis A(;d;;;D), and satises
Sample efficiency. The number of samples (labeled examples) in D is polynomial in 1=, d,
size(c), 1=, and log(1=);
Privacy. For all d and ;; > 0, algorithm A(;d;;;) is -dierentially private (as formu-
lated in Denition 2.1);
Utility. For all  > 0, algorithm A(;;;;) PAC learns C using H (as formulated in Deni-
tion 2.2).
An algorithm A is an ecient private PAC learner if it runs in time polynomial in 1=, d, size(c),
1=, log(1=). Also the private learner is called proper if H = C, otherwise it is called improper.
Remark 2.6. The privacy requirement in Denition 2.5 is a worst-case requirement. That is,
Inequality (1) must hold for every pair of neighboring databases D;D0 (even if these databases
are not consistent with any concept in C). In contrast, the utility requirement is an average-case
requirement, where we only require the learner to succeed with high probability over the distribution
of the databases. This qualitative dierence between the utility and privacy of private learners is
crucial. A wrong assumption on how samples are formed that leads to a meaningless outcome can
usually be replaced with a better one with very little harm. No such amendment is possible once
privacy is lost due to a wrong assumption. See [19] for further discussion.
Note also that each entry di in a database D is a labeled example. That is, we protect the
privacy of both the example and its label.
Observation 2.7. The computational separation between proper and improper learning also holds
when we add the privacy constraint. That is, unless RP=NP, no proper private learner can learn
k-term DNF, whereas there exists an ecient improper private learner that can learn k-term DNF
using a k-CNF. The ecient k-term DNF learner of [26] uses statistical queries (SQ) [20], which
can be simulated eciently and privately as shown by [3, 19].
More generally, such a gap can be shown for any concept class that cannot be properly PAC
learned, but can be eciently learned (improperly) in the statistical queries model.
2.4 Concentration Bounds
Cherno bounds give exponentially decreasing bounds on the tails of distributions. Specically,
let X1;:::; Xn be independent random variables where Pr[Xi = 1] = p and Pr[Xi = 0] = 1   p
for some 0 < p < 1. Clearly, E[
P
i Xi] = pn. Cherno bounds show that the sum is concentrated
around this expected value: For every 0 <   1,
Pr
hX
i Xi  (1 + )E
hX
i Xi
ii
 exp

 E
hX
iXi
i
2=3

;
Pr
hX
i Xi  (1   )E
hX
i Xi
ii
 exp

 E
hX
i Xi
i
2=2

;
Pr
h
 
X
i Xi   E
hX
i Xi
i
   
i
 2  exp
 
 22=n

: (2)
8The rst two inequalities are known as the multiplicative Cherno bounds [10], and the last in-
equality is known as the Cherno-Hoeding bound [17].
3 Proper Learning vs. Proper Private Learning
We begin by recalling the upper bound on the sample (database) size for private learning from [19].
The bound in [19] is for agnostic learning, and we restate it for (non-agnostic) PAC learning using
the following notion of -representation:
Denition 3.1. We say that a hypothesis class Hd -represents a concept class Cd over the domain
Xd if for every c 2 Cd and every distribution D on Xd there exists a hypothesis h 2 Hd such that
errorD(c;h)  .
Theorem 3.2 (Kasiviswanathan et al. [19], restated). Assume that there is a hypothesis class Hd
that =2-represents a concept class Cd. Then, for every 0 <  < 1, there exists a private PAC
learner for Cd using Hd that uses O((log(jHdj)+log(1=))=()) samples, where ;; and  are the
parameters of the private learner. The learner might not be ecient.
In other words, using Theorem 3.2 the number of samples that suces for learning a con-
cept class Cd is logarithmic in the size of the smallest hypothesis class that -represents Cd. For
comparison, the number of samples required for learning Cd non-privately is characterized by the
VC-dimension of Cd (by the lower bound of [15] and the upper bound of [6]).
In the following, we will investigate private learning of the following simple concept class. Let
T = 2d and Xd = f1;:::;Tg. Dene the concept class POINTd to be the set of points over f1;:::;Tg:
Denition 3.3 (Concept Class POINTd). For j 2 [T], dene cj : [T] ! f0;1g as cj(x) = 1 if
x = j, and cj(x) = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, dene POINTd = fcjgj2[T].
We note that we use the set f1;:::;Tg for notational convenience only { when discussing the
concept class POINTd we never use the fact that the elements in T are integer numbers.
The class POINTd trivially -represents itself, and hence, we get using Theorem 3.2 that it
is (properly) PAC learnable using O((log(jPOINTd j) + log(1=))=()) = O((d + log(1=))=())
samples. For completeness, we give an ecient implementation of this learner.
Lemma 3.4. There is an ecient proper private PAC learner for POINTd that uses O((d +
log(1=))=) samples.
Proof. We adapt the learner of [19]. Let POINTd = fc1;:::;c2dg. The learner uses the exponential
mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [23]. Let D = ((x1;y1);:::;(xm;ym)) be a database of samples
(the labels yi's are assumed to be consistent with some concept in POINTd). Dene for every
cj 2 POINTd,
q(D;cj) =  jfi : yi 6= cj(xi)gj;
i.e., q(D;cj) is negative of the number of points in D misclassied by cj. The private learner
A is dened as follows: output hypothesis cj 2 POINTd with probability proportional to exp( 
q(D;cj)=2). Since the exponential mechanism is -dierentially private [23], A is -dierentially
private. By [19], if m = O((d + log(1=))=()), then A is also a proper PAC learner.
We now show that A can be implemented eciently. Implementing the exponential mechanism
requires computing q(D;cj) for 1  j  2d. However, q(D;cj) is same for all j = 2 fx1;:::;xmg and
9can be computed in O(m) time, that is, q(D;cj) = qD, where qD =  jfi : yi = 1gj. Also for any
j 2 fx1;:::;xmg, the value of q(D;cj) can be computed in O(m) time. Let
P =
0
@
X
j2fx1;:::;xmg
exp(  q(D;cj)=2)
1
A + (2d   m)exp(  qD=2):
The algorithm A can be eciently implemented as the following sampling procedure:
1. For j 2 fx1;:::;xmg, with probability exp(  q(D;cj)=2)=P, output cj.
2. With probability (2d   m)  exp(  qD=2)=P, pick uniformly at random a hypothesis from
POINTd nfcx1;:::;cxmg and output it.
3.1 Separation Between Proper Learning and Proper Private Learning
We now show that private learners may require many more samples than non-private ones. We
prove that for any proper private earner for the concept class POINTd the required number of samples
is at least logarithmic in the size of the concept class, matching Theorem 3.2, whereas there exists
non-private proper learners for POINTd that use only a constant number of samples.
To prove the lower bound, we show that a large collection of m-record databases D1;:::;DN
exists, with the property that every PAC learner has to output a dierent hypothesis for each of
these databases (recall that in our context a database is a collection of labeled examples, supposedly
drawn from some distribution and labeled consistently with some target concept). As any two
databases Da and Db dier on at most m entries, dierential privacy implies that a private learner
must output on input Da the hypothesis that is accurate for Db (and not accurate for Da) with
probability at least (1   )  exp( m). Since this holds for every pair of databases, unless m is
large enough we get that the private learner's output on Da is, with high probability, a hypothesis
that is not accurate for Da.
In Theorem 3.6, we prove a general lower bound on the sample complexity of private learning
of a class Cd by a hypothesis classes Hd that is -minimal for Cd as dened in Denition 3.5.
In Corollary 3.8, we prove that Theorem 3.6 implies the claimed lower bound for proper private
learning of POINTd. In Lemma 3.9, we improve this lower bound for POINTd by a factor of 1=.
Denition 3.5. If Hd -represents Cd, and every H0
d ( Hd does not -represent Cd, then we say
that Hd is -minimal for Cd.
Theorem 3.6. Let Hd be an -minimal representation for Cd. Then, any private PAC learner
that learns Cd using Hd requires 
((log(jHdj) + log(1=))=) samples, where ;; and  are the
parameters of the private learner.
Proof. Let Cd be a class of concepts over the domain Xd and let Hd be -minimal for Cd. Since
for every h 2 Hd, the class Hd n fhg does not -represent Cd, we get that there exists a concept
ch 2 Cd and a distribution Dh on Xd such that on inputs drawn from Dh and labeled by ch, every
PAC learner (that learns Cd using Hd) has to output h with probability at least 1   .
Let A be a private learner that learns Cd using Hd, and suppose A uses m samples. We next
show that for every h 2 Hd there exists a database Dh 2 Xm
d on which A has to output h with
10probability at least 1   . To see that, note that if A is run on m examples chosen i.i.d. from
the distribution Dh and labeled according to ch, then A outputs h with probability at least 1   
(where the probability is taken over the randomness of A and the sample points chosen according
to D). Hence, a collection of m labeled examples over which A outputs h with probability at least
1    exists, and Dh is set to contain these m samples.
Take h;h0 2 Hd such that h 6= h0 and consider the two corresponding databases Dh and Dh0
with m entries each. Clearly, they dier in at most m entries, and hence, we get by the dierential
privacy of A that
Pr[A(Dh) = h0]  exp( m)  Pr[A(Dh0) = h0]
 exp( m)  (1   ):
Since the above inequality holds for every two databases corresponding to a pair of hypotheses in
H, we x an arbitrary h 2 H and get,
Pr[A(Dh) 6= h] = Pr[A(Dh) 2 Hd n fhg] =
X
h02Hdnfhg
Pr[A(Dh) = h0]
 (jHdj   1)  exp( m)  (1   ):
On the other hand, we chose Dh such that Pr[A(Dh) = h]  1   , equivalently, Pr[A(Dh) 6=
h]  . Therefore, (jHdj   1)  exp( m)  (1   )  . Solving the last inequality for m, we get
m = 
((log(jHdj) + log(1=))=) as required.
Using Theorem 3.6, we now prove a lower bound on the number of samples needed for proper
private learning concept class POINTd.
Proposition 3.7. POINTd is -minimal for itself for every  < 1.
Proof. Clearly, POINTd -represents itself. To show minimality, consider a subset H0
d ( POINTd,
where ci 62 H0
d. Under the distribution D that chooses i with probability one, errorD(ci;cj) = 1 for
all j 6= i. Hence, H0
d does not -represent POINTd.
The VC-dimension of POINTd is one.6 It is well known that a standard (non-private) proper
learner uses approximately VC-dimension number of samples to learn a concept class [6]. In con-
trast, we get that far more samples are needed for any proper private learner for POINTd. The
following corollary follows directly from Theorem 3.6 and Proposition 3.7:
Corollary 3.8. Every proper private PAC learner for POINTd requires 
((d+log(1=))=) samples.
We now show that the lower bound for POINTd can be improved by a factor of 1=, matching
(up to constant factors) the upper bound in Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 3.9. Every proper private PAC learner for POINTd requires 
((d+log(1=))=()) samples.
6Note that every singleton fjg where j 2 [T] is shattered by POINTd as cj(j) = 1 and cj0(j) = 0 for all j
0 6= j. No
set of two points fj;j
0g is shattered by POINTd as cj00(j) = cj00(j
0) = 1 for no j
00 2 [T].
11Proof. Dene the distributions Di (where 2  i  T) on Xd as follows: point 1 is picked with
probability 1    and point i is picked with probability . The support of Di is on points 1 and i.
We say a database D = (d1;:::;dm) where dj = (xj;yj) for all j 2 [m] is good for distribution
Di if at most 2m points from x1;:::;xm equal i. Let Di be a database where x1;:::;xm are i.i.d.
samples from Di with yj = ci(xj) for all j 2 [m]. By Cherno bound, the probability that Di is good
for distribution Di is at least 1   exp( m=3). Let A be a proper private learner. On Di, A has
to output h = ci with probability at least 1   (otherwise, if A outputs some h = cj, where j 6= i,
then errorDi(ci;h) = errorDi(ci;cj) = PrxDi[ci(x) 6= cj(x)] > , thus, violating the PAC learning
condition for accuracy). Hence, the probability that either Di is not good or A fails to return ci
on Di is at most exp( m=3) + . Therefore, with probability at least 1      exp( m=3), the
database Di is good and A returns ci on Di. Thus, for every i there exists a database Di that is
good for Di such that A returns ci on Di with probability at least 1  , where   = +exp( m=3).
Fix such databases D2;:::;DT. For every j, the databases D2 and Dj dier in at most 4m
entries (since each of them contains at most 2m entries that are not 1). Therefore, by the
guarantees of dierential privacy,
Pr[A(D2) 2 fc3;:::;cTg]  (T   2)exp( 4m)(1    ) = (2d   2)exp( 4m)(1    ):
Algorithm A on input D2 outputs c2 with probability at least 1    . Therefore,
(2d   2)exp( 4m)(1    )   :
Solving for m, we get the claimed bound.
We conclude this section showing that every hypothesis class H that -represents POINTd should
have at least d hypotheses. Therefore, if we use Theorem 3.2 to learn POINTd we need 
(logd)
samples.
Lemma 3.10. Let  < 1=2. jHj  d for every hypothesis class H that -represents POINTd.
Proof. Let H be a hypothesis class with jHj < d. Consider a table whose T = 2d columns correspond
to the possible 2d inputs 1;:::;T, and whose jHj rows correspond to the hypotheses in H. The
(i;j)th entry in the table is 0 or 1 depending on whether the ith hypothesis gives 0 or 1 on input
j. Since jHj < d = log(T), at least two columns j 6= j0 are identical, that is, h(j) = h(j0) for every
h 2 H. Consider the concept cj 2 POINTd (dened as cj(x) = 1 if x = j, and 0 otherwise), and the
distribution D with probability mass 1=2 on both j and j0. We get that errorD(cj;h)  1=2 > 
for all h 2 H (since for any hypothesis h(j) = h(j0), the hypothesis either errs on j or on j0).
Therefore, H does not -represent POINTd.
4 Proper Private Learning vs. Improper Private Learning
We now use POINTd to show a separation between proper and improper private PAC learning. One-
way of achieving a smaller sample complexity is to use Theorem 3.2 to improperly learn POINTd
with a hypothesis class H that -represents POINTd, but is of size smaller than jPOINTd j. By
Lemma 3.10, we know that every such H should have at least d hypotheses.
12In Section 4.1, we show that there does exist a H with jHj = O(d) that -represents POINTd.
This immediately gives a separation { proper private learning POINTd requires 
;;(d) samples,
whereas POINTd can be improperly privately learned using O;;(logd) samples. 7
We conclude that -representing hypothesis classes can, hence, be a natural and powerful tool
for constructing ecient private learners. One may even be tempted to think that no better
learners exist, and furthermore, that the sample complexity of private learning is characterized by
the size of the smallest hypothesis class that -represents the concept class. Our second result,
presented in Section 4.2, shows that this is not the case, and in fact, other techniques yield a
much more ecient learner using only O;;(1) samples, and hence demonstrating the strongest
possible separation between proper and improper private learners. The reader interested only in
the stronger result may choose to skip directly to Section 4.2.
4.1 Improper Private Learning of POINTd Using O;;(logd) Samples
We next construct a private learner applying the construction of Theorem 3.2 to the class POINTd.
For that we (randomly) construct a hypothesis class Hd that -represents the concept class POINTd,
where jHdj = O(d). Lemma 3.10 shows that this is optimal up to constant factors. In the rest of
this section, a set A  [T] represents the hypothesis hA, where hA(i) = 1 if i 2 A and hA(i) = 0
otherwise.
To demonstrate the main idea of our construction, we begin with a construction of a hypothesis
class Hd = fA1;:::;Akg that -represents POINTd, where k = O(
p
T=) = O(
p
2d=) (this should
be compared to the size of POINTd which is 2d). Every Ai 2 Hd is a subset of f1;:::;Tg, such that
(1) For every j 2 f1;:::;Tg there are more than 1= sets in H that contain j; and
(2) For every 1  i1 < i2  k, jAi1 \ Ai2j  1.
We next argue that the class Hd -represents POINTd. For every concept cj 2 POINTd there are
hypotheses A1;:::;Ap 2 Hd that contain j (where p = b1=c + 1) and are otherwise disjoint (that
is, the intersection between any two sets Ai1 and Ai2 is exactly j). Fix a distribution D. For every
Ai, errorD(cj;Ai) = PrD[Ai n fjg]. Since there are more than 1= such sets and the sets Ai n fjg
are disjoint, there exists at least one set such that errorD(cj;Ai)  . Thus, Hd -represents the
concept class POINTd.
We want to show that there is a hypothesis class, whose size is O(
p
T=), that satises the above
two requirements. As an intermediate step, we show a construction of size O(T). We consider a
projective plane with T points and T lines (each line is a set of points) such that for any two
points there is exactly one line containing them and for any two lines there is exactly one point
contained in both of them. Such projective plane exists whenever T = q2 +q+1 for a prime power
q (see, e.g., [18]). Furthermore, the number of lines passing through each point is q + 1. If we
take the lines as the hypothesis class for q  1=, then they satisfy the above requirements, thus,
they -represent POINTd. However, the number of hypotheses in the class is T and no progress was
made.
We modify the above projective plane construction. We start with a projective plane with
2T points and choose a subset of the lines: We choose each line at random with probability
7Remember, the notation O;;(g(n)) is a shorthand for O(h(;;)  g(n)) for some non-negative function h.
Similarly, the notation 
;;(g(n)).
13O(1=(
p
T)). Since these lines are part of the projective plane, they satisfy the above require-
ment (2). It can be shown that with positive probability for at least half of the j's requirement (1)
is satised and the number of chosen lines is O(
p
T=). We choose such lines, eliminate points that
are contained in less than 1= chosen lines, and get the required construction with T points and
O(
p
T=) lines. The details of the last steps are omitted.
We next show a much more ecient construction based on the above idea.
Lemma 4.1. For every  < 1, there is a hypothesis class Hd that -represents POINTd such that
jHdj = O(d=2).
Proof. We will show how to construct a hypothesis class Hd = fS1;:::;Skg, where every Si 2 Hd
is a subset of f1;:::;Tg and for every j
There are p = logT  (1 + b1=c) sets A1;:::;Ap in Hd that contain j such that
for every b 6= j, the point b is contained in less than logT of the sets A1;:::;Ap.
(3)
First we show that Hd -represents POINTd. Fix a concept cj 2 POINTd and a distribution D,
and consider hypotheses A1;:::;Ap in Hd that contain j. Since every point in these hypotheses is
contained in less than logT sets,
p X
i=1
Pr
D
[Ai n fjg] < logT  Pr
D
" p [
i=1
(Ai n fjg)
#
 logT:
Thus, there exists at least one set Ai such that errorD(cj;Ai) = PrD[Ai n fjg]  logT=p < . This
implies that Hd -represents the concept class POINTd.
We next show how to construct Hd. Let k = 8ep2=logT (that is, k = O(logT=2)). We choose
k random subsets of f1;:::;2Tg of size 4pT=k. We will show that a point j satises (3) with
probability at least 3=4. We assume d  16 (and hence, p  16 and T  16).
Fix j. The expected number of sets that contain j is k(4pT=k)=(2T) = 2p, thus, by Chebychev
inequality, the probability that less than p sets contain j is less than 2=p  1=8. We call this event
BAD1.
Let j be such that there are at least p sets that contain j and let A1;:::;Ap be p of them.
Notice that A1nfjg;:::;Apnfjg are random subsets of f1;:::;2Tgnfjg of size (4pT=k) 1. Now
x b 6= j. The probability that a random subset of f1;:::;2Tg n fjg of size (4pT=k)   1 contains
b is (4pT=k   1)=(2T   1) < 2p=k. For logT random sets of size (4pT=k)   1, the probability that
all of them contain b is less than (2p=k)
logT. Thus, the probability that there is a b 2 f1;:::;2Tg,
where b 6= j, and logT sets among A1;:::;Ap such that these logT sets contains b is less than
2T 

p
logT

(2p=k)
logT  2T  (ep=logT)
logT (2p=k)
logT (where e = exp(1))
= 2T 
 
2ep2=(klogT)
logT :
By the choice of k, 2ep2=(klogT) = 1=4, thus, the above probability is at most 2T  (1=4)logT =
2=T  1=8. We call this event BAD2.
To conclude, the probability that j does not satisfy (3) is the probability that either BAD1 or
BAD2 happens which is at most 1=4. Therefore, the expected number of j's that do not satisfy (3)
is less than T=2. By Markov inequality, the probability that more than T points j do not satisfy (3)
14is less than 1=2. We take k = O(logT=2) subsets of f1;:::;2Tg, denoted S1;:::;Sk, such that at
least T points j satisfy (3). By the probabilistic argument above, such sets exist. Let V be a set
of size T of the points that satisfy (3), and dene Hd = fS1 \ V;:::;Sk \ V g. Finally, by a simple
renaming, we can assume that Hd contains subsets of f1;:::;Tg as required.
From Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 3.2 we get:
Theorem 4.2. There exists an improper private PAC learner for POINTd that uses O((logd +
log 1
 + log 1
)=) samples, where ;, and  are the parameters of the private learner.
There is a dierence between the use of improper learning in Theorem 4.2 and typical use of
improper learning in non-private settings. Typically, a non-private learner uses a hypothesis class
that is larger than the size of concept class. This larger class enables learning in polynomial time.
We get an improved sample complexity by learning using a hypothesis class whose size is smaller
than the concept class.
4.2 Improper Private Learning of POINTd Using O;;(1) Samples
We now show a stronger separation result, namely, that POINTd can be privately (and eciently)
learned by an improper learner using just O;;(1) samples. We begin by presenting a non-private
improper PAC learner A1 for POINTd that succeeds with only constant probability. Roughly, A1
applies a simple proper learner for POINTd, and then modies its outcome by adding random
\noise". We then use sampling to convert A1 into a private learner A2; like A1 the probability
that A2 succeeds in learning POINTd is only a constant. Later we amplify the success probability
of A2 to get a private PAC learner. Both A1 and A2 are inecient as they output hypotheses with
exponential description length. However, using a pseudorandom function it is possible to compress
the outputs of A1 and A2, and achieve a private learning algorithms whose running time is ecient.
This is explained in Section 4.2.1.
Algorithm A2 described below is ?-dierentially private, where ? = ln(4) is a xed constant.
To construct an -dierentially private algorithm for every , we describe a transformation in
Lemma 4.4 that takes a bigger sample and replaces some samples with ? and executes A2 on the
resulting sample. Therefore, we assume that some of the sample points given to A1 and A2 are ?.
Algorithm A1. Given a sample z1;:::;zm, where every zi is either a labeled example (xi;yi) or
?, algorithm A1 performs the following:
1. If z1;:::;zm is not consistent with any concept in POINTd, return ? (this happens only if
for two indices i;j 2 [m] such that zi = (xi;yi) and zj = (xj;yj) either (1) xi 6= xj and
yi = yj = 1 or (2) xi = xj and yi 6= yj).
2. If yi = 0 for all i 2 [m] such that zi 6= ?, then let c = 0 (the all zero hypothesis); otherwise,
let c be the (unique) hypothesis from POINTd that is consistent with the labeled examples in
the sample.
3. Modify c at random to get a hypothesis h: for each x 2 [T] independently let h(x) = 1 c(x)
with probability =8 and, otherwise let h(x) = c(x). Return h.
15We next argue that if the sample z1;:::;zm contains at least 2ln(4)= examples zi = (xi;yi)
such that each xi is drawn i.i.d. according to a distribution D on [T], and the examples are labeled
consistently according to some cj 2 POINTd, then Pr[errorD(cj;c)  =2]  1=4. If the examples
are labeled consistently according to some cj 6= 0, then c 6= cj only if (j;1) is not in the sample
and in this case c = 0. If PrxD[x = j] < =2 and (j;1) is not in the sample, then c = 0 and
errorD(cj;0) < =2. Otherwise PrxD[x = j]  =2; thus, the probability that all examples of the
form (xi;yi) are not (j;1) is at most ((1   =2)2=)ln(4)  1=4 (as there are at least 2ln(4)= such
examples).
To see that A1 PAC learns POINTd (with condence at least 1=2) note that,
E
h
[error
D
(c;h)] = E
h
E
xD
[jh(x)   c(x)j] = E
xD
E
h
[jh(x)   c(x)j] =

8
;
and hence, using Markov's inequality,
Pr
h
[error
D
(c;h)  =2]  1=4:
Combining this with Pr[errorD(cj;c)  =2]  1=4 and errorD(cj;h)  errorD(cj;c) + errorD(c;h),
implies that Pr[errorD(cj;h)  ]  1=2.
Algorithm A2. We now modify the learner A1 to get a private learner A2 (a similar idea was
used in [19] for learning parity functions). Given a sample z1;:::;zm0, where every zi is either a
labeled example (xi;yi) or ?, algorithm A2 performs the following:
1. With probability =8, return ?.
2. Construct a set S  [m0] by picking each element of [m0] with probability p = =4.
3. Run the non-private learner A1 on the examples indexed by S.
Claim 4.3. Let  < 1=2, ? = ln(4), and ? = 3=4. Algorithm A2 is an ?-dierentially private
(;?)-PAC learner for the class POINTd provided that it is given a sample which contains at least
32ln(4)=2 labeled examples (i.e., m0  32ln(4)=2).
Proof. We rst show that A2 PAC learns POINTd with condence at least ? = 3=4. Let S be the
set chosen by A2. The expected number of samples is at least p  (32ln(4))=2 = 8ln(4)=. By
Cherno bound, the probability that the sample indexed by S contains less than 2ln(4)= (in fact,
4ln(4)=) samples is less than exp( ln(4)=) < 1=16 (since A2 gets at least 32ln(4)=2 labeled
examples and  < 1=2). Algorithm A2 can err only when either A1 does not get 2ln(4)= labeled
examples, or when A1 errs, or when A2 returns ? in Step (1). Therefore, we get that A2 PAC learns
POINTd with accuracy parameter 0 =  and condence parameter 0 = 1=16 + 1=2 + =8  3=4.
We next show that A2 is ?-dierentially private. Let D;D0 be two neighboring databases, and
assume that they dier on the ith entry. Recall that after sampling S, one of them can be consistent
with some cj, while the other might not be consistent. First let us analyze the probability of A2
outputting ?:
Pr[A2(D) =?]
Pr[A2(D0) =?]
=
p  Pr[A2(D) =? j i 2 S] + (1   p)  Pr[A2(D) =? j i = 2 S]
p  Pr[A2(D0) =? j i 2 S] + (1   p)  Pr[A2(D0) =? j i = 2 S]

p  1 + (1   p)  Pr[A2(D) =? j i = 2 S]
p  0 + (1   p)  Pr[A2(D0) =? j i = 2 S]
=
p
(1   p)  Pr[A2(D0) =? j i = 2 S]
+ 1 
8p
(1   p)
+ 1;
16where the last equality follows by noting that if i = 2 S then A2 is equally likely to output ? on
D and D0, and the last inequality follows as ? is returned with probability =8 in Step (1) of
Algorithm A2.
For the more interesting case, where A2 outputs a hypothesis h, we get:
Pr[A2(D) = h]
Pr[A2(D0) = h]
=
p  Pr[A2(D) = h j i 2 S] + (1   p)  Pr[A2(D) = h j i = 2 S]
p  Pr[A2(D0) = h j i 2 S] + (1   p)  Pr[A2(D0) = h j i = 2 S]

p  Pr[A2(D) = h j i 2 S] + (1   p)  Pr[A2(D) = h j i = 2 S]
p  0 + (1   p)  Pr[A2(D0) = h j i = 2 S]
=
p
1   p

Pr[A2(D) = h j i 2 S]
Pr[A2(D) = h j i = 2 S]
+ 1;
where the last equality uses the fact that if i = 2 S then A2 is equally likely to output h on D and D0. If
in D the ith row is ?, then Pr[A2(D) = h j i 2 S] = Pr[A2(D) = h j i = 2 S] = Pr[A2(D0) = h j i = 2 S],
and the above ratio is bounded by p=(1   p) + 1 = 1=(1   =4) < 4=3 < e?
.
To complete the proof, we need to bound the ratio of Pr[A2(D) = h j i 2 S] to Pr[A2(D) =
h j i = 2 S] when zi = (xi;yi).
Pr[A2(D) = h j i 2 S]
Pr[A2(D) = h j i = 2 S]
=
P
R[m0]nfig Pr[A2(D) = h j S = R [ fig]  Pr[A2 selects R from [m0] n fig]
P
R[m0]nfig Pr[A2(D) = h j S = R]  Pr[A2 selects R from [m0] n fig]
 max
R[m0]nfig
Pr[A2(D) = h j S = R [ fig]
Pr[A2(D) = h j S = R]
: (4)
In the max in (4), we only need to consider sets R such that the sample labeled by the elements
in R is consistent, that is, Pr[A2(D) = h j S = R] > 0. Now having or not having access to (xi;yi)
can only aect the choice of h(xi), and since A1 ips the output with probability =8, we get
max
R[m0]nfig
Pr[A2(D) = h j S = R [ fig]
Pr[A2(D) = h jS = R]

1   =8
=8

8

:
Putting everything together, we get
Pr[A2(D) = h]
Pr[A2(D0) = h]

8p
(1   p)
+ 1 =
8
(4   )
+ 1 < 3 + 1 = e?
:
Algorithm A2 is ?-dierentially private for some xed ?. We reduce ? to any desired  using
the following lemma (implicit in [19]). In this lemma, we assume that the learning algorithm can
handle \undened entries", i.e., entries of the form ?.8
Lemma 4.4. Let A be an ?-dierentially private algorithm. Construct an algorithm B that on
input a database D = (d1;:::;dn) constructs a new database Ds whose ith entry is di with probability
f(;?) = (exp()   1)=(exp(?) + exp()   exp(   ?)   1) and ? otherwise, and then runs A on
Ds. Then, B is -dierentially private.
8These ? entries cannot be simply removed as the question if two databases are neighbors depends on the locations
of the ?'s.
17Proof. Let D;D0 be neighboring databases, and assume they dier on the ith entry. Let S  [n]
denote the indices of the random set of entries that are not changed to ?. Let q = f(;?). Since D
and D0 dier in just the ith entry, for any outcome t, Pr[A(Ds) = tji 62 S] = Pr[A(D0
s) = tji = 2 S].
Thus,
Pr[B(D) = t]
Pr[B(D0) = t]
=
q  Pr[A(Ds) = tji 2 S] + (1   q)  Pr[A(Ds) = tji 62 S]
q  Pr[A(D0
s) = tji 2 S] + (1   q)  Pr[A(Ds) = tji 62 S]
=
P
R[n]nfig Pr[S n fig = R]  (q  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R [ fig] + (1   q)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R])
P
R[n]nfig Pr[S n fig = R]  (q  Pr[A(D0
s) = tjS = R [ fig] + (1   q)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R])
 max
R[n]nfig
q  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R [ fig] + (1   q)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R]
q  Pr[A(D0
s) = tjS = R [ fig] + (1   q)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R]
 max
R[n]nfig
q  exp(?)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R] + (1   q)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R]
q  exp( ?)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R] + (1   q)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R]
=
1 + q  (exp(?)   1)
1   q  (1   exp( ?))
= exp():
The last inequality follows because by the guarantees of dierential privacy
Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R [ fig]  exp(?)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R [ ;];
and
Pr[A(D0
s) = tjS = R [ fig]  exp( ?)  Pr[A(D0
s) = tjS = R [ ;]
= exp( ?)  Pr[A(Ds) = tjS = R [ ;] (as R  [n] n fig):
Therefore, B is an -dierentially private algorithm.
Claim 4.5. Let  < 1=2, 0 <   1 and 0 <  < 1. There exists an -dierentially private
(;)-PAC learner for the class POINTd which uses a sample of size poly(1=;1=;log(1=)).
Proof. We rst apply the transformation described in Lemma 4.4 on algorithm A2. Call the re-
sulting algorithm A3. In this case ? = ln(4) and
f(;?) =
exp()   1
exp(?) + exp()   exp(   ?)   1
> =6
for  < 1 (since exp() 1  ). By Cherno bound, if we take a sample of size 384ln(4)=(2) and
choose each example with probability at least =6, then with probability at least 1 exp( 32ln(4))
the resulting sample size is at least 32ln(4)=2. Now if given 32ln(4)=2 samples, A2 returns a
hypothesis with error at most  with probability at least 1=4. Therefore, the total probability
that A2 returns a hypothesis with error greater than  is at most exp( 32ln(4)) + 3=4 (the rst
term comes from A2 not getting enough samples and the second term comes from A2 returning
a hypothesis with error greater than  even after getting enough samples). Thus, the algorithm
resulting from the transformation described in Lemma 4.4 returns a hypothesis with error at most
18 with probability at least 1 (exp( 32ln(4))+3=4) > 1=5 (i.e., condence parameter of the above
learner is 4=5).
We next privately boost the condence parameter of the learner from 4=5 to any value  > 0
similar to [19]. We execute N = log5=4(5=) times algorithm A3 with accuracy =8 and disjoint
samples; we get N hypotheses Hyp = fh1;:::;hNg. With probability at least 1 (4=5)N = 1 =5
at least one of the hypotheses has error less than =8. We need to privately choose such a hypothesis.
To achieve this goal we take a fresh sample of size m = 24ln(3=2)=(), compute the mistake of
each hypothesis on this sample, and use the exponential mechanism of [23] to choose the hypothesis.
Specically, let mi be the number of errors that hypothesis hi has on the sample; return the
hypothesis hi with probability
exp( mi=2)
PN
j=1 exp( mj=2)
:
Changing one example can reduce mi by at most 1 and increase mj by at most one for every
i 6= j (thus, increasing
PN
j=1 exp( mj=2) by at most exp( =2)); therefore the selection of the
hypothesis is -dierentially private.
We next argue that with probability at least 1  the selected hypothesis hi has error at most .
With probability at least 1 =5, at least one of the hypotheses from Hyp has error less than =8; by
Cherno bound with probability at least 1 2=3 this hypothesis has empirical error9 at most =4.
Let us call E1 the event that there exists a hypothesis with error less than =8 and empirical error less
than =4 in Hyp. Event E1 happens with probability at least (1 =5)(1 2=3) > 1 (=5+2=3).
On the other hand, the probability that a hypothesis hj that has error greater than  has
empirical error  =2 is less than 2=3. By the union bound, the probability that there is such
hypothesis in Hyp is at most =3 (since N  1= for   0:01). Let us call E2 the event that
all hypotheses in Hyp with error greater than  have empirical error greater than =2. Event E2
happens with probability at least 1   =3.
Conditioned on E1, the probability that a hypothesis with empirical error  =2 is selected by
the exponential mechanism is at most
exp( m=4)
PN
j=1 exp( mj=2)

exp( m=4)
exp( m=8)
= exp( m=8):
The rst inequality holds because conditioned on E1 there exists a hypothesis (say, h`) in Hyp with
empirical error less than =4. Therefore, m`  (=4)m, and
N X
j=1
exp( mj=2)  exp( m`=2)  exp( m=8):
Since m = 24ln(3=)=(), the value of exp( m=8) is at most 3=27. Therefore, conditioned on
E1 and E2, the probability that a specic hypothesis with error greater than  is selected by the
exponential mechanism is at most 3=27, and by the union bound, the probability that a hypothesis
with error greater than  is selected by the exponential mechanism is at most N  3=27  2=27.
By removing all the conditioning, we get that the selected hypothesis has error greater than  with
probability at most =5 + 2=3 + =3 + 2=27  .
9Given an input D = (d1;:::;dm) where each di = (xi;c(xi)) is a labeled example, the empirical error of h is
1
mjfi : h(xi) 6= c(xi)gj.
194.2.1 Making the Learner Ecient
The outcome of A1 (hence, A2) is a hypothesis whose description is exponentially long (since it
contains a list of the indices where the output was ipped). We now complete our construction
by compressing this description using a pseudorandom function. The running time of the resulting
algorithm is polynomial and the hypothesis it returns has a short description.
We use a slightly non-standard denition of (non-uniform) pseudorandom functions from binary
strings of size d to bits; these pseudorandom functions can be easily constructed given standard
pseudorandom functions (which in turn can be constructed under standard assumptions [16]).
Roughly speaking, a collection of functions is pseudorandom if it cannot be distinguished from
truly random functions. We start by dening the random functions in our denition.
Denition 4.6. Dene H
q
d : f0;1gd ! f0;1g as a random variable, where each value H
q
d(x) for
x 2 f0;1gd is selected i.i.d. to be 1 with probability q and 0 otherwise.
We consider a (non-uniform) polynomial-time distinguishing algorithm (represented by a circuit)
Cd that can query a function in polynomially many points. Any such algorithm should not be able
to distinguish if the answers of the function are random or are answered according to a random
function from the pseudorandom family. Formally,
Denition 4.7. Let F = fFdgd2N be a function ensemble, where for every d, Fd is a set of
functions from f0;1gd to f0;1g. We say that the function ensemble F is q-biased pseudorandom if
for every family of polynomial-size circuits with oracle access fCdgd2N, every polynomial p(), and
all suciently large d's,

 Pr[C
f
d(1d) = 1]   Pr[C
H
q
d
d (1d) = 1]

  <
1
p(d)
: (5)
In the above inequality, the rst probability is taken over the random choice of f with uniform
distribution from Fd, and the second probability is taken over the random variable H
q
d.
For convenience, for d 2 N, we consider Fd as a set of functions from f1;:::;Tg to f0;1g, where
T = 2d. We set q = =4 in the above denition. Using an =4-biased pseudorandom function
ensemble F (such functions can be constructed from standard pseudorandom functions [16]), we
change Step (3) of algorithm A1 as follows:
3'. If c = 0, let h be a random function from Fd. Otherwise (i.e., c = cj for some j 2 [T]), let h
be a random function from Fd subject to h(j) = 1. Return h.
Call the resulting modied algorithm A4. We next show that A4 is a PAC learner. Note that there
exists a negligible function negl such that for large enough d,
jPr[h(x) = 1jh(j) = 1]   =4j  negl(d)
for every x 2 f1;:::;Tg (as otherwise, we get a non-uniform distinguisher for the ensemble F).
Thus,
E
h2Fd
[error
D
(c;h)] = E
h2Fd
E
xD
[jh(x)   c(x)j]
 E
h2Fd
E
xD
[h(x)] = E
xD
E
h2Fd
[h(x)] 

4
+ negl(d):
20The rst inequality follows as for all x 2 [T], h(x)  c(x) by our restriction on the choice of h.
Thus, by the same arguments as for A1, algorithm A4 is a PAC learner.
We next modify algorithm A2 by executing the learner A4 instead of the learner A1. Call the
resulting modied algorithm A5. To see that algorithm A5 preserves dierential privacy it suces
to give a bound on (4). By comparing the case where S = R with S = R [ fig, we get that the
probability for a hypothesis h can increase only if c = 0 when S = R, and c = ci when S = R[fig.
Therefore,
max
R[m0]nfig
Pr[A5(D) = h j S = R [ fig]
Pr[A5(D) = h jS = R]

1
(=4)   negl(d)

1
(=8)
=
8

:
Applying the same steps as in the proof of Claim 4.5, we get the following result.
Theorem 4.8. There exists an ecient improper private PAC learner for POINTd that uses O;;(1)
samples, where ;, and  are the parameters of the private learner.
Lemma 3.9 and Theorem 4.8 give the following separation:
Theorem 4.9. Every proper private PAC learner for POINTd requires 
((d+log(1=))=()) sam-
ples, whereas there exists an ecient improper private PAC learner that can learn POINTd using
O;;(1) samples. Here, ;, and  are the parameters of the private learners.
4.3 Restrictions on the Hypothesis Class of Private Learners with Low Sample
Complexity
We conclude this section by showing that every (improper) private learner for POINTd using o(d)
samples must return hypotheses that evaluate to one on many points (in contrast, every hypothesis
in POINTd returns the value one on just one input). This explains why our algorithms for POINTd
that use o(d) samples return \complex" hypotheses.
Denition 4.10 (weight). The weight of a hypothesis h is the number of points for which it returns
the value one, i.e., jfi : h(i) = 1gj.
Theorem 4.11. There exists no private PAC learner for POINTd with sample complexity o;;(d)
that for every distribution returns, with probability at least half, hypotheses with weight 2o;;(d)
(where the probability is taken over the randomness of the learner and the sample points chosen
according to the distribution). Here, ;, and  are the parameters of the private learner.
Proof. In the proof assume the contrary, i.e., there exists a private learner that for every distribution
returns hypotheses with weight 2o;;(d) with probability at least half. We prove that, under
this assumption, there is a proper private learning algorithm for POINTd with sample complexity
o;;(d), in contradiction with Lemma 3.9.
Let ct 2 POINTd be the target concept. Assume for contradiction that there exists an -
dierentially private (;)-PAC learner A0 for POINTd with sample complexity o;;(d) that for
every distribution returns, with probability at least 1=2, hypotheses of weight less than z, for
z = 2o;;(d) (where the probability is taken over the randomness of A0 and the sample points
chosen according to the distribution).
Let D denote the underlying sample distribution. Construct a proper learner A (for POINTd)
which on input ;d;; does the following:
211. Let k = ln(=2)=ln(3=4).
2. Invoke k times the algorithm A0 with parameters ;d;=2;0 = 1=4, each time on a fresh
logz sized i.i.d. sample drawn from D and labeled by ct. Let h1;:::;hk0 (where k0  k) be
the hypotheses returned in these executions with weight less than z.
3. If k0 = 0 halt with failure, otherwise set Hd = fcj : hi(j) = 1 for some i 2 [k0]g.
4. Invoke the proper private learner of Lemma 3.4 with parameters ;;=2 and hypothesis
class Hd on a fresh ` = O((log(jHdj) + log(1=))=()) sized i.i.d. sample drawn from D and
labeled by ct. Output the hypothesis returned by the learner.
Note that ` = O((log(jHdj) + log(1=))=()) = o;;(d), and that the sample complexity of
A is klogz + ` = o;;(d). Furthermore, A always returns a hypothesis in POINTd (note that
Hd  POINTd). Hence, if A is a private learner for POINTd, we get a contradiction to Lemma 3.9.
Note that A is -dierentially private (follows since A0 is -dierentially private and in Step (4),
we invoke the -dierentially private algorithm from Lemma 3.4 on a fresh sample).
To conclude the proof we show that A is indeed a learner for POINTd. Note that for each of the
hypotheses hi returned by A0 in Step (2), we have that
Condition 1: Pr[error
D
(ct;hi)  =2]  1   0 =
3
4
; and
Condition 2: Pr[hi has weight less than z] 
1
2
;
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A0 and the sample points chosen according
to D. We get that hi satises both the above conditions with probability at least 1=4, and the
probability that none of the hypotheses A0 outputs satisfy both these conditions is at most (3=4)k =
=2.
We henceforth assume that a hypothesis, hi, returned by A0 in Step (2) is of weight less than
z and errorD(ct;hi)  =2. We claim that in this case Hd contains a hypothesis cj 2 Hd for which
errorD(ct;cj)  =2, as if hi(t) = 1 then we can set j = t, and otherwise, j can be any point such
that hi(j) = 1, as
error
D
(ct;cj) = Pr
xD
[x = t] + Pr
xD
[x = j]  Pr
xD
[x = t] + Pr
xD
[hi(x) = 1] = error
D
(ct;hi)  =2:
In other words, Hd =2-represents fctg.
To conclude the proof, we observe that having Hd =2-represent fctg suces for the proof of
Theorem 3.2, and hence, the hypothesis (in Step (4)) returned by the learner of Theorem 3.2 is
with probability at least 1   =2 within error  from ct.
To summarize, we get that A is a proper private learner for POINTd under distribution D with
sample complexity o;;(d). Since this holds for every D this leads to a contradiction to Lemma 3.9
(the lemma shows that there exists a distribution for which there is no proper private learner for
POINTd with sample complexity o;;(d)).
5 Private Learning of Intervals (Partial Results)
In this section, we examine INTERVALd, a concept class that like POINTd is very natural and simple
and has VC-dimension 1. By Theorem 3.6, any proper private learner for INTERVALd requires
22
;;(d) samples (as INTERVALd is -minimal for itself), and we ask whether stronger separation
results than we showed for POINTd can be proved forINTERVALd. Specically, we ask if we can prove
a lower bound of !;;(1) for any private learner forINTERVALd (i.e., also for improper private
learners).
We give partial results towards answering this question. In Section 5.1, we show that if there
exists an O;;(1) sample sized improper private learner for INTERVALd, then it must use hypotheses
that are very unlike intervals, and in fact must switch exponentially many times between zero and
one (this is similar to the result presented for POINTd in Section 4.3). Then, in Section 5.2, we take
a deeper look into improper private learning of INTERVALd, and prove that the technique from Sec-
tion 4.2 that yielded the ecient private learner for POINTd with sample complexity O;;(1) cannot
yield an algorithm for INTERVALd with sample complexity o;;(d). In other words, the technique
of adding independent noise from Section 4.2, even with exponentially many switch points, does
not yield a learner for INTERVALd with o;;(d) sample complexity.
Before proving the above results, let us rst formally dene INTERVALd and establish a sample
complexity lower bound for proper private learning this concept class.
Denition 5.1. The concept class INTERVALd is fcj : j 2 f1;:::;T + 1gg where T = 2d and the
concept cj : [T] ! f0;1g maps all x < j to 1 and all x  j to 0.
Unlike the concept class POINTd, the values of elements of Xd are signicant in the sense that the
geometric relation of which point is to the left of the other is meaningful. Note that the cardinality
of INTERVALd is 2d + 1, and that it is -minimal for itself (for all  < 1=2), and hence, we can
use Theorem 3.6 and get a lower bound on the sample complexity of proper private learners for
INTERVALd.
Lemma 5.2. Every proper private PAC learner for INTERVALd requires 
((d+(1=))=) samples.
5.1 Restrictions on the Hypothesis Class of Private Learners with Low Sample
Complexity
We give an insight on the structure of the hypothesis class of an improper private learner for
INTERVALd with sample complexity o;;(d). We show that if such a learner for INTERVALd ex-
ists, then it must return, with high probability, a hypothesis that switches frequently between zero
and one. Therefore, the hypothesis outputted by the learner has a very dierent structure com-
pared to the concepts in INTERVALd, which switch exactly once from 1 to 0. This result resembles
Theorem 4.11, where we proved a similar structural statement for private learning POINT class.
Denition 5.3 (Switching Point). We say that j is a switching point in hypothesis h if h(j) 6=
h(j   1). If h(j   1) = 1 we say that j is a decreasing switching point. Otherwise, we say the
switching point is increasing. The points 1 and T + 1 are also referred to as switching points. The
point 1 is a increasing switching point if h(1) = 1 and decreasing otherwise. The point T + 1 is a
increasing switching point if h(T) = 0 and decreasing otherwise.
We next prove that every private learner with sample complexity o;;(d) returns with high
probability a hypothesis with an exponential number of switching points. We prove this using
a method similar to the proof of the previous theorem. We assume that a learner exists which
returns with constant probability a hypothesis with too little switching points. We then show that
a proper private learner can be reconstructed from this hypothesis. For the reconstruction, we use a
23simplied version of the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [23]. Existence of a proper
private learner for the class INTERVALd with sample complexity o;;(d) leads to a contradiction to
Lemma 5.2.
Theorem 5.4. There exists no private PAC learner for INTERVALd with sample complexity o;;(d)
that for every distribution returns, with probability at least half, hypotheses with 2o;;(d) switching
points (where the probability is taken over the randomness of the learner and the sample points
chosen according to the distribution). Here, ;; and  are the parameters of the private learner.
Proof. Let D denote the underlying sample distribution. Every concept c 2 INTERVALd consists of
exactly one decreasing switching point. Discovering this point is discovering the accurate concept.
Assume rst that the target concept is ct for some 1  t  T + 1 and we have a hypothesis
h such that errorD(ct;h)  . Let j and k be two consecutive switching points in h such that
j  t  k. 10 Assume rst that the switching point j is decreasing (and, thus, k is increasing). Note
that cj(x) = ct(x) = 1 for every x < j and cj(x) = ct(x) = 0 for every x  t. Therefore, cj is a
hypothesis which only errs on fj;:::;t   1g. Also cj(x) = h(x) = 0 for every x 2 fj;:::;t   1g.
Therefore, we can refer to cj as a concept which is reconstructed from h (it is chosen from h's
switching points) and which xes all of h's errors in f1;:::;j  1g[ft;:::;Tg. On the other hand,
h errs on every point in fj;:::;t   1g, so cj does not introduce new errors to h. We get that
error
D
(ct;cj)  error
D
(ct;h)  :
Similarly, if j is an increasing switching point, then k is decreasing, then ck is such that
error
D
(ct;ck)  error
D
(ct;h)  :
Dene
SWITCH(h) = fcj : j is a switching point in hg:
Note that SWITCH(h) 6= ; by construction. By our discussion above, if h is such that errorD(ct;h) 
 then so is the case for at least one concept in SWITCH(h). Clearly, jSWITCH(h)j is bounded by the
number of switching points in h.
Remark 5.5. Note that if the empirical error of h on some sample database D is less than , then
using same arguments as above there exists a concept in SWITCH(h) whose empirical error on D is
also less than .
As in [19], we use the exponential mechanism in order to choose a hypothesis out of SWITCH(h)
(we used the same mechanism in the proof of Claim 4.5).
We now have enough tools for the proof. Assume that A0 is an -dierentially private (;)-
PAC learner for the class INTERVALd with a sample complexity o;;(d) that on every distribution
returns, with probability at least 1=2, hypotheses with at most z = z(;;;d) = 2o;;(d) switching
points. Let s = 8ln(12
 )=(2)+8ln

(6 )z


=()+K

1
 log 1
 + 1
 log 1


for some constant K to
be set below.
Construct a proper private learner A as follows:
1. Let 0 = 
4; 0 =

6:
10The switching points j and k exist as points 1 and T + 1 are always switching points.
242. For i in f1;:::;log 1
0g:
(a) Draw o;;(d) new samples from D and label it by ct. Let D0 denote these labeled
examples.
(b) Apply A0 with parameters ;0;0 on D0. Let hi be the returned hypothesis.
3. Let ^ h denote the rst hypothesis in fh1;:::;hlog(1=0)g such that jSWITCH(hi)j  z. If no such
^ h exists, return \FAIL".
4. Draw s additional samples according to D and label it by ct. Let Ds denote these labeled
examples.
5. Choose a concept c out of SWITCH(^ h) using the exponential mechanism on Ds with parameter
 and return it.
We now show that A is a proper private (;)-PAC learner with sample complexity o;;(d).
This is a contradiction to Lemma 5.2.
First, note that according to the assumption, Step (2b) is given enough samples. Also according
to the assumption, for every i we have that Pr[jSWITCH(hi)j  z]  1=2. Therefore, Step (3) fails
with probability at most (1=2)log(1=0) = 0. Since the chosen hypothesis ^ h is a uniformly distributed
hypothesis conditioned on jSWITCH(^ h)j  z (an event with probability at least half), the probability
that errorD(ct;^ h)  0 is at most 20+0 = 30 (20 comes from the Step (2b) and 0 from Step (3)).
In our next analysis, we assume that errorD(ct;^ h) < 0. Denote by [ errorDs(h0) the empirical er-
ror of a hypothesis h0 on the samples Ds, and let Q = [ errorDs(^ h). Clearly, EDs [Q] = errorD(ct;^ h) 
0, where the expectation is over the drawing of the samples Ds in Step (4). We can bound Q with
high probability using Cherno-Hoeding bound (Inequality (2)) and get
Pr
 
 Q   E
Ds
[Q]
 
   0

 2exp
 
 2s02
:
Since s > 8ln(12
 )=(2) = ln( 2
0)=(202), we have
Pr

 
Q   E
Ds
[Q]

 
  0

 0:
Since EDs[Q]  0, we now have Pr[Q  20]  0. For the analysis of the last step we assume
that indeed
[ errorDs(^ h)  20:
Next, we analyze the complexity and accuracy of the exponential mechanism step. Let
good(Ds;^ h) = fcj 2 SWITCH(^ h) : [ errorDs(cj)  30g:
That is, good(Ds;^ h) contains the concepts in SWITCH(^ h) that are inconsistent with less than 30s
samples, i.e., concepts such that mcj  30s. Let bad(Ds;^ h) be all the other concepts in SWITCH(^ h).
Let Egood (resp. Ebad) be the event that a concept in good(Ds;^ h) (resp. bad(Ds;^ h)) is chosen by the
exponential mechanism in Step (5). Remember, we assumed [ errorDs(^ h)  20. Also remember that
if [ errorDs(^ h)  20, then, according to observations mentioned in Remark 5.5 there is at least one
25concept c? 2 SWITCH(^ h) whose empirical error is also bounded by 20 (therefore, c? 2 good(Ds;^ h)).
So in Step (5),
Pr[Egood]
Pr[Ebad]
=
P
cj2good(Ds;^ h) exp(   mcj=2)
P
cj2bad(Ds;^ h) exp(   mcj=2)

exp(   mc?=2)
P
cj2bad(Ds;^ h) exp(   mcj=2)

exp( 0s)
P
cj2bad(Ds;^ h) exp( 30s=2)

exp( 0s)
jSWITCH(^ h)j  exp( 30s=2)
=
exp(0s=2)
jSWITCH(^ h)j

exp(0s=2)
z
:
Since s > 8ln

(6 )z


=() = 2ln(
(1 0)z
0 )=(0), we get that
Pr[Egood]
1   Pr[Egood]
=
Pr[Egood]
Pr[Ebad]

1   0
0
and, thus, Pr[Egood]  1   0. Therefore, if ^ h satises [ errorDs(^ h)  20 and it has less than z
switching points, then Step (5) returns with probability at least 1   0 a concept c 2 INTERVALd
such that [ errorDs(c)  30. For our last analysis, we assume that indeed a concept with empirical
error bounded by 30 was chosen in Step (5).
Finally, we show that c, the concept returned by A, has indeed errorD(c;ct)   with high
probability. As the VC-dimension of INTERVALd is 1, by [6], there exists a constant ` such that
whenever more than `

1
0 log 1
0 + 1
0 log 1
0

samples are drawn from some distribution D, then
Pr
 errorD(ct;c)   [ errorDs(c)
   0
 0. Remember that s > K

1
 log 1
 + 1
 log 1


for some
constant K (depending on `). As we assumed [ errorDs(c)  30, we nally have that errorD(ct;c) 
40 =  with probability at least 1   0.
Next we analyze the condence parameter of A. We now list the bad events. As said before,
the probability of errorD(ct;^ h)  0 at the end of Step (3) is bounded by 30. After this ^ h is chosen
in Step (3), its empirical error on the samples Ds is too high with probability bounded by 0. The
exponential mechanism fails to return a concept c with low empirical error on Ds with probability
bounded by 0. Finally, if the exponential mechanism successfully returned a concept with low
empirical error, then the misclassication error of c is too high with probability bounded by 0.
Using the union bound, we get that the probability of any of the above bad events happening is
bounded by 60. Therefore,
Pr

error
D
(ct;c)  

 60 = :
We now calculate the sample complexity. Note that samples are drawn in Step (4) and many
times in Step (2a). As we assumed the sample complexity of A0 is o;;(d) and it is executed
log(1=0) times, we get that the total sample complexity of this step is o;;(d). (Remember that 0
and 0 are of the same order as  and .) Also note that since z = 2o;;(d), the sample complexity of
Step (4) is s = o;;(d). Therefore, the sample complexity of A is log(1=0)o;;(d)+s = o;;(d).
Finally, note that we assumed A0 maintains -dierential privacy. Also the exponential mech-
anism maintains -dierential privacy. Since any execution of the inner algorithms is on dierent
independently drawn samples of the whole sample set, the learner A maintains -dierential privacy.
26Combining all the above statements we have that if there is an -dierentially private (=4;)-
PAC learner for INTERVALd with sample complexity o;;(d) that for every distribution returns,
with probability at least half, a hypotheses with 2
;;(d) switching points, then there is a proper
-dierentially private (;)-PAC learner for INTERVALd with sample complexity o;;(d). This
contradicts Lemma 5.2.
5.2 Impossibility of Private Independent Noise Learners with Low Sample Com-
plexity
We next show that the ideas used to construct in Section 4.2 a private learner for POINTd with sample
complexity O;;(1) cannot be used for INTERVALd. We begin by formalizing a class of independent
noise learners that generalizes the construction in Section 4.2. We note that independent noise
learners are allowed to output hypotheses whose description is exponential in d (recall that this
issue was resolved for POINTd by using compression with pseudorandom functions).
Denition 5.6 (Private Independent Noise Learner). A private independent noise learner for a
concept class Cd over Xd using sample size m0 and parameters 0;0; is a pair of algorithms
(Aouter;Ainner), called the outer and inner learners respectively, that for all concepts c 2 Cd, all
distributions D on Xd, given an input D = (d1;:::;dm0), where di = (xi;c(xi)) with xi drawn i.i.d.
from D for all i 2 [m0], does the following:
1. The outer learner Aouter is a private PAC learner (as dened in Denition 2.5) for Cd using
the class of all 2jXdj functions Xd ! f0;1g. Furthermore, Aouter(;d;0;0;D) is restricted
to execute as follows:
(a) Select parameters ?  0;?  0, and a noise rate  as a (deterministic) function of
;0;0.
(b) Run Ainner(d;?;?;D). Denote the output hypothesis c?.
(c) If c? 62 Cd then output \fail" and halt. Otherwise, produce a hypothesis h by addition of
noise to all entries of c? independently, i.e., for all x 2 Xd set h(x) = 1   c?(x) with
probability , and h(x) = c?(x) otherwise.
2. The inner learner Ainner outputs with probability at least 1 ? (over the randomness of Ainner
and the sampling of D according to D) a hypothesis c? 2 Cd such that errorD(c?;c)  ?.
Example 5.7. We show that algorithm A2, described in Section 4.2, is a private independent noise
learner for POINTd. In order to do this, we describe algorithm A2 in a dierent way than the
description in Section 4.2.11 The outer learner is the learner dened in Denition 5.6 selecting
parameters ? = 0=2;0 = 3=4;? = 1=2, and a noise rate  = 0=8. The inner learner does the
following:
1. Set  = 0.
2. Get a sample (x1;y1);:::;(xm0;ym0), where xi's are chosen according to D and m0 = 32ln(4)=2.
3. With probability =8, return ?.
11For simplicity of the description, we ignore the fact that some of the sample points can be ?.
274. Construct a set S  [m0] by picking each element of [m0] with probability =4.
5. If ((xi;yi))i2S is not consistent with any concept in POINTd, return ?.
6. If yi = 0 for all i 2 S, then let c = 0 (the all zero hypothesis); otherwise, let c be the (unique)
hypothesis from POINTd that is consistent with the labeled example ((xi;yi))i2S.
As analyzed in Section 4.2, algorithm A2 is ln(4)-dierentially private. It is also (0;0)-PAC
learner. To construct an algorithm that is -dierentially private for smaller values of , we use a
transformation described in Lemma 4.4. It can be seen that the resulting algorithm is also a private
independent noise learner.
Furthermore, in the above description of A2, the condence parameter is 0 = 3=4. In Sec-
tion 4.2, we boosted the condence parameter by using the exponential mechanism. The resulting
learning algorithm is not a private independent noise learner. However, for any constant 0, we can
modify A2 such that the resulting algorithm has condence 0 and is a private independent noise
learner; however, the sample complexity of the resulting algorithm is not polynomial in log(1=0).
We next show that there is no private independent noise learner for INTERVALd using only
o;;(d) samples. We will show that in this case, we can essentially recover the outcome of the
inner learner (with probability at least 1    a hypothesis in INTERVALd) from the outcome of
the outer learner. It follows then that the existence of a private independent noise learner for
INTERVALd that uses o;;(d) samples implies a proper private learner for INTERVALd that uses
o;;(d) samples, in contradiction with Lemma 5.2.
Theorem 5.8. There is no private independent noise learner for INTERVALd for 0 < 1=4 and
0 < 0=100 that learns using m0 = o0;0;(d) samples.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that a private independent noise learner (Aouter;Ainner)
exists for INTERVALd. Let D denote the underlying sample distribution and ct 2 INTERVALd denote
the target concept. Consider an execution of Aouter when invoked with parameters 0;0 where
0 < 1=2 (we will further restrict 0;0 below). We rst show a simple bound on the noise rate
 = (0;0) selected by Aouter. Denote by ?  0;?  0 the parameters that Aouter selects for
the inner learner. Denote by c? the concept returned by Ainner and by h the concept returned by
Aouter (or ? if Aouter halts without an output).
Note that by the denition of a private independent noise learner, Ainner outputs c? 2 INTERVALd
satisfying errorD(ct;c?)  ? with probability at least 1   ?. Similarly, since Aouter is a learner,
we get that Aouter outputs h satisfying errorD(ct;h)  0 with probability at least 1   0. In both
cases, the probability is taken over the randomness in the execution of the learner (for Aouter this
includes the randomness of Ainner) and the sample points chosen according to D. We, hence, dene
the event
E :
Ainner outputs c? 2 INTERVALd satisfying errorD(ct;c?)  ?; and
Aouter outputs h satisfying errorD(ct;h)  0
and conclude that Pr[E]  1   0   ? > 0.
In the following, we bound Eh [errorD(ct;h)] , Eh ExD [jh(x)   ct(x)j], assuming E. This will
28yield an upper bound on .
E
h

error
D
(ct;h) jE

= E
h
E
xD
h
jh(x)   ct(x)j

 E
i
 E
h

E
xD
h
jh(x)   c?(x)j
 
E
i
  E
xD
h
jct(x)   c?(x)j
 
E
i
(6)
 E
h
E
xD
h
jh(x)   c?(x)j
 
E
i
  ? (7)
= E
xD
E
h
h
jh(x)   c?(x)j

 E
i
  ? =    ?: (8)
Inequality (6) follows from the triangle inequality, i.e., jh(x) c?(x)j  jh(x) ct(x)j+jct(x) c?(x)j,
and Inequality (7) follows from errorD(ct;c?)  ?. On the other hand, by the denition of E
E
h

error
D
(ct;h) jE

< 0: (9)
Noting that the setting of  is deterministic (and, hence, the setting of  does not depend on
whether the event E holds), we get from Inequalities (8) and (9) that 0     ?, and hence,
  20. It follows that by choosing 0 to be small enough, we restrict  to be small.
We now show how to reconstruct c? from h. The reconstruction algorithm is as follows:
1. For every t 2 f1;:::;T+1g dene mismatch(t;h) = jfx < t : h(x) = 0gj+jfx  t : h(x) = 1gj.
2. Find ` for which mismatch(`;h) is the lowest and return c`.
3. If no such unique point exists, return \FAIL".
We now bound the probability that c` 6= c?. We call a point x for which noise was added by
Aouter (i.e., h(x) 6= c?(x)) dirty, otherwise we call x clean. Let j be such that cj = c?. Then,
mismatch(j;h) is the number of dirty points. The reconstruction algorithm fails to return c? if and
only if there is some point k such that mismatch(k;h)  mismatch(j;h). In this case, we say that
k is bad. We show that for small enough , such a bad point exists only with constant probability.
In the following, we assume that k > j (the case k < j is symmetric). First note that cj and
ck disagree agree only on points in fj;:::;k   1g (i.e., mismatch(j;h) and mismatch(k;h) have
the same contribution from points not between j and k). Now every dirty point in fj;:::;k   1g
contributes 1 to mismatch(j;h) and nothing to mismatch(k;h), and similarly each clean point
between fj;:::;k   1g contributes 1 to mismatch(k;h) and nothing to mismatch(j;h). Since we
assumed that mismatch(k;h)  mismatch(j;h), it should be the case that at least half the entries
in fj;:::;k   1g are dirty.
We consider the case where there is a bad point bigger than j (the case where it is smaller than
j is handled analogously). Let k > j be the smallest bad point which is bigger than j, that is, k is
the smallest such that the number of dirty points in fj;:::;k   1g is at least the number of clean
points. Hence, k = j + 1 if and only if j is a dirty point; if k > j + 1 then for all j < ` < k the
number of clean entries in fj;:::;`   1g exceeds the number of dirty points (otherwise ` is a bad
point smaller than k). From the above arguments it follows that the number of clean points in
fj;:::;k   1g equals the number of dirty points in fj;:::;k   1g.
Let noisej be a sequence starting from j which indicates which entries in c? were ipped by
Aouter, i.e., every dirty point bigger than j is marked by 1 in noisej, and every clean point is
marked by 0. According to the above analysis, we get that there exists a bad point k > j only if
29 noisej begins with 1 (this if the case when k = j + 1), or
 noisej begins with some Dyck word, where a Dyck word is a balanced string of \parentheses"
in the sense that it consists of n zeros and n ones, and in every prex the number of ones
does not exceed the number of zeros (this is the case when k > j + 1).
The probability of noisej to begin with 1 is . The probability of noisej to start with a specic
Dyck word of length 2n is n(1   )n. The number of Dyck words of length 2n is the nth Catalan
number, Cn = 1
n+1
 2n
n

, and we get that the probability of a bad k > j is bounded by
 +
1 X
n=1
Cn  n(1   )n:
Note that this is a loose bound because as every Dyck word is a prex of longer Dyck words, and so
we over count many possibilities of bad noise. Using the Stirling approximation, Cn u 4n
n3=2p
  4n
n
p

for every n  1. Therefore, the probability of failure to reconstruct cj from h due a bad k > j is
bounded by
 +
1 X
n=1
Cn  n(1   )n   +
1 X
n=1
Cn  n
  +
1 X
n=1
(4)n
n
p

=  +
1
p

1 X
n=1
(4)n
n
=  +
1
p

( ln(1   4)):
The last equality follows from the Taylor series of ln(x). As ( ln(1   4)) < 5 for every   0:09,
the probability of failure to reconstruct c? out of h due to a bad k > j is bounded by + 1 p
5 < 4.
Due to symmetry, the probability of failing because of a bad k < j is also bounded by 4. Thus,
for small enough values of , the probability of failure to reconstruct Ainner's original output c?
(i.e., the probability that c` 6= c?) from h is bounded by 8.
To conclude the proof, we construct A, a proper private learner for INTERVALd, using Aouter.
Learner A executes as follows:
1. Let 0 =

4 and 0 =
min(;)
100 .
2. Apply Aouter with parameters ;d;0;0 to improperly learn INTERVALd using o0;0;(d) sam-
ples. Let h be the output of Aouter. If Aouter fails then halt.
3. Reconstruct a concept c` 2 INTERVALd out of the noisy hypothesis h (as described in the
reconstruction algorithm above) and return it.
Note that the sample complexity of A is o0;0;(d) = o;;(d). Also note that the reconstruction
step does not access D, but only the output of Aouter. As Aouter is -dierentially private, so is A.
Finally, note that the probability that A fails to output c` 2 INTERVALd such that errorD(c`;c)   is
bounded by the probability that the reconstruction algorithm fails, (i.e., c` 6= c?) and the probability
that Ainner fails to output c? 2 INTERVALd such that errorD(c?;c)  ?  0  . Remember that
30  20. Since 20  0:02 (for   1) this implies that   0:02 and the above condition   0:09
is satised, and hence,
Pr[error
D
(c`;ct)  ]  ? + 8  0 + 8  20 

4
+ 16 

100
 :
Note that ?  0 from the denition of private independent noise learner. Thus, the algorithm
A returns a concept c` = c? 2 INTERVALd such that Pr[errorD(c`;ct)  ]  , and so it is a
proper -dierentially private (;)-PAC learner for INTERVALd with sample complexity o;;(d),
in contradiction to Lemma 5.2.
6 Separation Between Ecient and Inecient Proper Private PAC
Learning
In this section, we use the sample size lower bound for proper private learning POINTd (Corollary 3.8)
to obtain a separation between the sample complexities of ecient and inecient proper private
PAC learning. In the case of ecient proper private learning, we use a slightly relaxed notion of
proper learning for reasons explained below.
In our separation we use pseudorandom generators, which we now dene. Let Ur represent
a uniformly random string from f0;1gr. Let `(d) : N ! N be a function and G = fGdgd2N be
a deterministic algorithm such that on input from f0;1g`(d) it returns an output from f0;1gd.
Informally, we say that G is pseudorandom generator if on `(d) truly random bits it outputs d bits
that are indistinguishable from d random bits. Formally, for every probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm B there exists a negligible function negl(d) (i.e., a function that is asymptotically smaller
than 1=dc for all c > 0) such that

Pr[B(Gd(U`(d))) = 1]   Pr[B(Ud) = 1]

  negl(d): (10)
Pseudorandom generators G with `(d) = !(logd) exist under various strong hardness assump-
tions [16]. The dierence d   `(d) is dened as the stretch of the pseudorandom generator.
Let POINTd = fc1;:::;c2dg. To an ecient (polynomially bounded) private learner, the concept
cGd(U`(d)) would appear as a uniformly random concept picked from POINTd. Dene concept class
\ POINTd = fcGd(r) jr 2 f0;1g`(d)g:
First, we show that, assuming G is a pseudorandom generator, there exists no ecient proper
learner for \ POINTd (note that this statement holds even without the privacy constraint). Assume
Ap is an ecient proper learner for \ POINTd. We use Ap to construct a distinguisher for the pseu-
dorandom generator as follows: Given j 2 f1;:::;2dg, we construct the database D with m entries
(j;1). If Ap(D) = cj, then the distinguisher returns 1, otherwise it returns 0.
(1) If j is in the image of Gd, then by the utility guarantee of the proper learner, Ap has to return
cj on D with probability at least 1   . Thus, the distinguisher returns 1 with probability at
least 1    when j is chosen from Gd(U`(d)).
(2) If j is not in the image of Gd, then the database D is not labeled consistently by any concept in
\ POINTd. Consider any such j, a proper learner that returns a hypothesis from \ POINTd implies a
31distinguisher that never returns 1 (i.e., always returns 0). Therefore, the probability that the
distinguisher returns 1 when j = Ud is at most the probability that j is in the image of Gd,
which is at most `(d)=2d = negl(d).
To summarize, assuming Ap is an ecient proper learner for \ POINTd, the distinguisher will
return 1 with probability at least 1    when j = Gd(U`(d)), and with probability at most negl(d)
when j = Ud, in contradiction to (10). We conclude that no ecient proper learner exists for
\ POINTd and, therefore, we relax in the following our notion of proper private learners for \ POINT
to allow outputting hypothesis from POINT. We show that under this liberal relaxation, ecient
proper learning of \ POINTd with sample complexity o(d) is not possible. However, we show that
inecient proper private learning of \ POINTd with sample complexity o(d) is possible under the
strict denition of proper learning.
Sample Complexity of Eciently Private Learning \ POINTd using POINTd. Consider an
ecient private learner Ae that learns \ POINTd using POINTd and has sample complexity m. We
now show that either a distinguisher exists for the pseudorandom generator Gd or m = 
;(d).
Assume  < 1=4.
We use Ae to construct a distinguisher for the pseudorandom generator as follows: Given
j 2 f1;:::;2dg, we construct the database D with m entries (j;1). If Ae(D) = cj, then the
distinguisher returns 1, otherwise it returns 0.
If for at least a 3=4th fraction of the values j 2 [2d], algorithm Ae, when applied to a database
with m entries (j;1), does not return cj with probability at least 3=4, then the distinguisher succeeds
in breaking the pseudorandom generator. This is because if the above statement is not true then
the distinguisher returns 1 with probability at most 3=4 when j = Ud, and the distinguisher will
return 1 with probability at least 1    > 3=4 when j = Gd(U`(d)). 12
However, arguments similar as in the proof of Theorem 3.6 show that it is not possible to
have a learner that on 3=4th fraction of the values j 2 [2d], when applied to a database with
m = o((d + log(1=))=) entries (j;1), returns cj with probability at least 3=4. This means that
either we have a distinguisher for the pseudorandom generator or the sample complexity of Ae is
at least 
;(d). So, assuming the existence of a pseudorandom generator, we get that there exists
no ecient private learner that learns \ POINTd using POINTd and has o((d + log(1=))=) sample
complexity. 13
Sample Complexity of Inecient Proper Private Learners for \ POINTd. If the learner
is not polynomially bounded, then it can use the algorithm from Theorem 3.2 to privately learn
\ POINTd. Since j\ POINTdj = 2`(d), the private learner from Theorem 3.2 uses O((`(d)+log(1=))=())
samples.
We get the following separation between ecient and inecient proper private learning:
Theorem 6.1. Let `(d) be any function that grows as !(logd). Assuming the existence of a
pseudorandom generator Gd : f0;1g`(d) ! f0;1gd, there exists no ecient proper PAC learner for
12If j is in the image of Gd, then the analysis is same as (1) above. By utility guarantees, Ae has to return cj
on D with probability at least 1  . Thus, the distinguisher returns 1 with probability at least 1   when j chosen
from Gd(U`(d)).
13An almost matching upper bound of O((d+log(1=))=) on the sample complexity for eciently private learning
\ POINTd using POINTd can be obtained as in Lemma 3.4.
32\ POINTd and every ecient (polynomial-time) private PAC learner that learns \ POINTd using POINTd
requires 
((d+log(1=))=) samples, whereas there exists an inecient proper private PAC learner
that can learn \ POINTd using O((`(d) + log(1=))=()) samples.
Remark 6.2. In the non-private setting, there exists an ecient proper learner that can learn
\ POINTd using POINTd with O((log(1=) + log(1=))=) samples (as VCDIM(\ POINTd) = 1). In the
non-private setting, we also know that even inecient learners require 
(log(1=)=) samples [15,
21]. Therefore, for \ POINTd the sample complexity dierence that we observe in Theorem 6.1 does
not exist without the privacy constraint.
7 Lower Bounds for Non-Interactive Sanitization
We now prove a lower bound on the database size (or sample size) needed to privately release an
output that is useful for all concepts in a concept class. We start by recalling a denition and a
result of Blum et al. [4].
Let X = fXdgd2N be some discretized domain and consider a class of predicates C over X. A
database D contains points taken from Xd. A predicate query Qc for c : Xd ! f0;1g in C is dened
as
Qc(D) =
jfdi 2 D : c(di) = 1gj
jDj
:
A sanitizer (or data release mechanism) is a dierentially private algorithm A that gets as input
a database D and outputs another database b D with entries taken from Xd. An algorithm A is
(;)-useful for predicates in the class C if for every database D with probability at least 1  the
algorithm A(D) returns a database b D such that for every c 2 C,
jQc(D)   Qc( b D)j < :
Theorem 7.1 (Blum et al. [4]). For any class of predicates C, and any database D 2 Xm
d , such
that
m  O

log(jXdj)  VCDIM(C)log(1=)
3
+
log(1=)


;
there exists an (;)-useful mechanism A that preserves -dierential privacy. The algorithm might
not be ecient.
We show that the dependency on log(jXdj) in Theorem 7.1 is essential: there exists a class of
predicates C with VC-dimension O(1) that requires jDj = 
;;(log(jXdj)). For our lower bound,
the sanitized output b D could be any arbitrary data structure (not necessarily a synthetic database).
Remember that a synthetic database contains data drawn from the same domain as the original
database and Theorem 7.1 outputs a synthetic database. For simplicity, however, here we focus on
the case where the output is a synthetic database. The proof of this lower bound uses ideas from
Section 3.1.
Theorem 7.2. Every -dierentially private non-interactive mechanism that is (;)-useful for
POINTd requires an input database of size 
((d + log(1=))=()).
33Proof. Let T = 2d and Xd = [T] be the domain. Consider the class POINTd. For every i 2 [T],
construct a database Di 2 Xm
d by setting (1   3)m entries as 1 and the remaining 3m entries
as i (for i = 1 all entries of D1 are 1). For i 2 [T] n f1g, we say that a database b D is -useful
for Di if 2 < Qci( b D) < 4 and 1   4 < Qc1( b D) < 1   2. We say that b D is -useful for D1 if
1  < Qc1( b D)  1. It follows that for i 6= j, if b D is -useful for Di then it is not -useful for Dj.
Let b Di be the set of all databases that are -useful for Di. Note that for all i 6= 1, databases
D1 and Di dier on 3m entries, and by our previous observation, b D1 \ b Di = ;. Let A be an
(;)-useful private release mechanism for POINTd. For all i, on input Di mechanism A should pick
an output from b Di with probability at least 1   . We get by the dierential privacy of A that
Pr[A(D1) 2 b Di]  exp( 3m)Pr[A(Di) 2 b Di]  exp( 3m)  (1   ):
Hence,
Pr[A(D1) 62 b D1]  Pr[A(D1) 2
[
i6=1
b Di]
=
X
i6=1
Pr[A(D1) 2 b Di] (sets b Di are disjoint)
 (T   1)exp( 3m)  (1   ):
On the other hand, since A is (;)-useful, Pr[A(D1) 62 b D1] < , and hence, we get that
m = 
((d + log(1=))=()).
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